

Generating Business Referrals for SMEs:

1 The Contingent Value of CEOs' Social Capital

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- 3** *We examine how small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) chief executive officers' (CEOs) social capital (as measured by strength of ties and structural holes) can help them bring business to their firms through the spread of positive referrals. Based on a sample of 408 French SME CEOs, we find a direct effect of social capital. Such effect is contingent on the CEO's personality, with social capital being most beneficial to CEOs with low levels of conscientiousness. CEOs' social ties facilitate the distortion of information, thereby leading personal contacts to give referrals to and endorse a focal CEO, even in the presence of negative signals, such as low conscientiousness.*

Introduction

Firms receive a referral when a third party recommends them to a previously unknown potential customer, which may result in additional business. Although business referrals are valuable for all types of firms (Kumar, Petersen, and Leone 2010; Money, Gilly, and Graham 1998; Provan 1984), small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) should pay particular attention to this way of gaining customers. First, SMEs usually have only limited resources to dedicate to the search for new customers, and to marketing efforts in general. Positive word of mouth and recommendations are particularly cost-effective (Trusov, Bucklin, and Pauwels 2009; Villanueva, Yoo, and Hanssens 2008) because they can occur in the absence of any effort from the firm. Second, due to their small size and the limited scope of their activities, SMEs generally have lower profiles than large firms, which makes reputation building difficult

(Goldberg, Cohen, and Fiegenbaum 2003). As a result, sources of information about an SME are limited, making it difficult for potential customers to assess whether or not it would be profitable to do business with that firm. Opinions and information circulated by third parties increase a firm's prominence, thereby making it more attractive as a trustworthy supplier (Le and Nguyen 2009; Seevers, Skinner, and Dahlstrom 2010).

The marketing literature on referral behaviors particularly focuses on current customers that are satisfied with the product as the most important source of referrals (Kumar, Petersen, and Leone 2010). Nevertheless, several studies of small businesses suggest that another source might contribute substantially, either directly or indirectly, to the generation of business referrals: the personal relationships of the SME chief executive officer (CEO). These studies found that CEOs use their personal networks of relationships to circulate favorable information in

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1 order to obtain more business for their firms
2 (Jack 2005; Johannisson 1996; Uzzi 1997; Zhou,
3 Wu, and Luo 2007). This particular contribution
4 of social contacts owes to the fact that the
5 contacts hold first-hand information about the
6 CEO's reliability and may be motivated to transfer
7 it to other individuals as a way of helping.
8 Although these studies have made important
9 contributions by highlighting the importance of
10 social ties in favoring referral behaviors, questions
11 that are crucial for business practice
12 remain unanswered: Why do some CEOs obtain
13 more business referrals than others through
14 their personal relationships? How can CEOs
15 maximize referrals and thereby ensure business
16 growth? The present study addressed these
17 questions.

18 Our first objective was to examine which
19 configurations of CEO social capital induce the
20 most business referrals. To this effect, we use
21 an individual approach to social capital, which
22 focuses on the potential that social relationships
23 offer for the circulation of information
24 (Adler and Kwon 2002; Burt 1992; Inkpen and
25 Tsang 2005). This approach can be used to
26 capture differences between CEOs in terms of
27 social capital and to determine how these differences
28 may affect a CEO's potential to obtain
29 business referrals. We argue that CEOs with
30 strong ties and structural holes in their personal
31 networks will benefit from more favorable
32 word of mouth and therefore more business
33 referrals. The underlying rationale is that maximizing
34 business referrals through social ties
35 basically requires two elements: an ability to
36 circulate information far beyond the set of
37 persons that the CEO already knows (structural
38 holes) and the motivation to circulate this information
39 (strong ties). By identifying the configurations
40 of social capital that lead to more
41 business referrals, we contribute to a better
42 understanding of how SMEs may enhance their
43 business performance.

44 The individual approach to social capital
45 has already contributed to the study of SMEs
46 by using similar variables to explain important
47 outcomes, such as innovation, growth, or
48 export performance (Ellis 2000; Julien,
49 Andriambeloston, and Ramangalahy 2004;
50 Ozgen and Baron 2007; Zhou, Wu, and Luo
51 2007). However, this approach has left the
52 complexity of social capital underexplored.
53 Apart from notable exceptions focusing on
54 entrepreneurial ventures (Stam and Elfring
55 2008; Vissa and Chacar 2009), the CEO's

social capital has been considered an unequivocally beneficial factor, regardless of boundary conditions. However, CEOs are individuals who perceive, understand, and react to their environment differently (Becherer and Maurer 1999; Ciavarella et al. 2004; Covin and Slevin 1989), which suggests that any benefits they may obtain from their social capital will also vary according to their personal characteristics.

Therefore, the second objective of our study was to investigate the characteristics of SME CEOs as contingent factors of social capital. In doing so, we respond to the call for further research into how actor-level characteristics affect the outcomes of social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002; Zhou et al. 2009). In line with recent work on the interaction between social capital and personality in organizational settings (Anderson 2008; Baer 2010; Zhou et al. 2009), we consider personality traits as a crucial factor affecting the impact of social capital in the context of SMEs. Our research refers to theories of information circulation through social ties (Burt 2005; Ferrin, Dirks, and Shah 2006; Wong and Boh 2010), and we argue that during social interactions a CEO's social contacts pick up behavioral cues indicating positive or negative personality traits. These observations form the basis for judgments and assessments that will affect their willingness to recommend the CEO's company to other people and that will ultimately impact the quality of information circulating along social ties. As a result, the effect of social capital should be contingent on a CEO's personality.

In order to pursue these objectives, the paper is structured as follows. We first examine the mechanism of business referrals and their importance for SMEs. We then analyze CEOs' social capital in the light of the individual approach to social capital. This leads to hypotheses about the impact of the key dimensions of strength of ties and structural holes on business referrals, and on its contingency to personality traits. After presenting the methodology and data collection process, together with our sample of 408 CEOs of small and medium-sized manufacturing companies, we describe the results of the survey. They offer new insights about how one particular trait of the CEO, conscientiousness, moderates the effect of social capital in the circulation of favorable information: Rather than intensifying the

1 positive outcomes of high conscientiousness,
2 social capital attenuates the negative outcomes
3 of lower conscientiousness. We conclude the
4 paper by discussing the implications and limi-
5 tations of these findings.

6 ***Theoretical Framework*** 7 **Business Referrals in the Context** 8 **of SMEs**

9 Because they can significantly help the
10 process of customer acquisition, business
11 referrals have received considerable attention
12 in the marketing literature. Although they are
13 less controllable and manageable than market-
14 ing actions (e.g., direct mail, broadcast
15 media), referrals have some serious advan-
16 tages (Chen, Wang, and Jinhong 2011; Kumar,
17 Petersen, and Leone 2010; Trusov, Bucklin,
18 and Pauwels 2009). First, their influence on
19 attitudes and beliefs about a firm is much
20 stronger (Villanueva, Yoo, and Hanssens
21 2008). Information about a product, a service
22 or a firm is indeed considered more credible
23 by potential customers when it is transferred
24 through referrals than when it comes from
25 the firm itself (Anderson, Hakansson, and
26 Johanson 1994; Seevers, Skinner, and
27 Dahlstrom 2010). Second, referrals contribute
28 to customer acquisition at a much lower cost
29 than marketing actions (Trusov, Bucklin, and
30 Pauwels 2009). Indeed, they often take place
31 as a result of spontaneous information circu-
32 lation from one person to the other rather
33 than because of a firm's deliberate efforts.
34 This argument is particularly crucial for SMEs
35 as they tend to have limited resources to dedi-
36 cate to gaining the attention of potential cus-
37 **4** tomers (Goldberg, Cohen, and Fiegenbaum
38 2003).

39 Despite the great advantages of referrals,
40 though, their impact on customer acquisition
41 might vary with the type of purchasing deci-
42 sion. The fact that someone recommends a
43 company to a potential customer does not nec-
44 essarily lead the latter to become an actual
45 customer. Business referrals seem to be espe-
46 cially valuable when very first-hand informa-
47 tion is needed before making purchasing
48 decisions (Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson
49 1994; Seevers, Skinner, and Dahlstrom 2010).
50 This is particularly the case in situations of
51 business-to-business relationships with high
52 uncertainty due to product complexity or the
53 need for substantial mid- and long-term com-
54 mitments (Bensaou and Anderson 1999; Mooi
55

and Ghosh 2010). In these situations, establish-
ing a new business relationship on the sole
basis of publicly available information about
the partner is risky (Podolny 1994). Screening
and selecting a new business partner through
third parties seems much safer, as these third
parties can provide important knowledge about
the trustworthiness and capabilities of the other
firm (Li and Rowley 2002). Moreover, trust
accumulated over a long period between the
focal firm and some third party can simply be
transferred to the newly formed dyad (Uzzi
1997). Similarly, a firm can expect the potential
partner to be more cooperative if there is a
third party, as any opportunistic behavior in
their new relationship would create a serious
threat of sanctions in the relationship it has
already established with the third party
(Podolny 1994).

In the context of SMEs, research has shown
that referrals are based on the circulation of
information about a firm's CEO at least as
much (if not more) as about the firm in
general. Studies of the specific case of entre-
preneurial ventures are particularly enlighten-
ing in this respect. As newcomers to business,
entrepreneurs tend to leverage the personal
ties developed in earlier educational or pro-
fessional situations (Hallen 2008). These indi-
viduals know the entrepreneur well and they
can therefore compensate the lack of a track
record by serving as referrals to other compa-
nies who would otherwise never consider the
newborn company (Harrison, Dibben, and
Mason 1997; Larson 1992; Shane and Cable
2002; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999). As a
result, Jack found that the mobilization of an
entrepreneur's personal social ties is a key
factor in obtaining orders through recommen-
dations (Jack 2005). Similar mechanisms have
also been observed among established SMEs,
such as in Uzzi's (1997) study of the New
York apparel industry, which showed that the
maintenance of close personal relationships
by CEOs leads to business referrals. He found
that it is possible for two companies whose
CEOs do not know each other to quickly
establish new commercial relationships if the
two CEOs are engaged in a personal relation-
ship with a third person who can recommend
them doing business together (Uzzi 1997).

All these findings suggest that the unique
combination of social ties around a CEO can
make a serious difference by circulating favor-
able information leading to business referrals.

1 Yet they do not really tackle the issue of why
2 some CEOs have personal networks that lead to
3 more referrals than others. By relying on the
4 well-established concept of social capital, our
5 goal is to conceptualize the key differences
6 across CEOs in terms of their personal net-
7 works so as to identify which configuration of
8 personal relationships favors the best outcomes
9 in terms of referrals.

11 **The Benefits of Individual Social Capital**

12 In the field of SMEs, the importance of per-
13 sonal relationships for business success has
14 been examined from a number of perspectives.
15 Some authors have referred to embeddedness
16 (Granovetter 1985) to designate situations
17 where business decisions appear to be gov-
18 erned by social framing and the structure of the
19 network of social ties (Uzzi 1997; Yli-Renko
20 and Autio 1998), whereas others have evoked
21 social networks (BarNir and Smith 2002;
22 Molina-Morales and Martinez-Fernandez 2010;
23 Zhou, Wu, and Luo 2007) or social capital
24 (Pirolo and Presutti 2010). In Asia, *guanxi*, a
25 similar notion, has been shown to be an impor-
26 tant aspect of business life, with implications
27 for firm strategy (Carlisle and Flynn 2005; Chen
28 and Chen 2004).

29 Adler and Kwon (2002) made a crucial con-
30 tribution by showing how these approaches
31 relate to the broader concept of social capital
32 and contribute to two very different streams.
33 One stream emphasizes the collective dimen-
34 sion of social relationships, seeing social
35 capital as “an attribute of a social unit, rather
36 than an individual” (Inkpen and Tsang 2005,
37 p. 150), a public good that is shared, available
38 to, and bringing benefits to all members of a
39 group (Inkpen and Tsang 2005). Our paper
40 builds on the second stream, which considers
41 social capital from an individual point of
42 view, as a concept that “helps explain the dif-
43 ferential success of individuals and firms in
44 their competitive rivalry” (Adler and Kwon
45 2002, p. 19). This stream sees social capital
46 more as “a private good” (Inkpen and Tsang
47 2005, p. 150), based on the notion that a con-
48 figuration of social ties surrounding an actor
49 is highly idiosyncratic and can therefore bring
50 unique advantages to one actor over the
51 others.

52 This stream of research clearly established
53 that the ideal configuration of social capital has
54 to be analyzed in terms of the quality and
55 structure of the ties surrounding an actor rather

than their number (Adler and Kwon 2002).
Both these qualitative and structural dimen-
sions have been discussed, raising two theoret-
ical debates, one over the benefits of weak
versus strong ties (Granovetter 1973; Hansen
1999) and the other over the benefits of dense
networks of interconnected contacts versus
sparse networks of unrelated others (Burt
1992).

The question of what level of tie strength and
what type of structure bring the most positive
outcomes has also been discussed in the field of
SMEs. Differences among CEOs on these dimen-
sions have been reported to explain variance in
terms of firm growth (Stam and Elfring 2008;
Vissa and Chacar 2009), innovation (Julien,
Andriambeloson, and Ramangalahy 2004), and
export performance (Ellis 2000; Zhou, Wu, and
Luo 2007). These studies argue that such results
account for the ability of social capital to give
CEOs access to an important resource, namely
information. For example, strong personal con-
tacts in the same business help provide CEOs
with an accurate picture of their competitive
environment, making it easier for them to set
prices (Ingram and Roberts 2000). Similarly,
certain ties can facilitate the recognition of new
business opportunities by providing a CEO with
timely information about market changes (Ellis
2000; Ozgen and Baron 2007), and some ties
make it easier for SMEs to source external
knowledge (McEvily and Zaheer 1999). All
these studies share the argument that personal
contacts have knowledge of the environment
which they can transfer to the CEO, and that
some structures and levels of strength of a
CEO's ties are more effective than others in this
respect.

However, social capital can also help infor-
mation travel in the opposite direction. A CEO's
personal contacts have information about the
CEO that they can transfer to other individuals
who are potential customers or who can them-
selves circulate such information to potential
customers. Although some studies investigating
the types of structure and the levels of tie
strength that give the best returns in terms of
communicating favorable information have
been carried out in organizational settings (Burt
2005; Ferrin, Dirks, and Shah 2006; Wong and
Boh 2010), there has been no such investiga-
tion with respect to SMEs. This void is all the
more surprising given that such a study would
help understand which configurations of social
capital generate the most referrals for firms and

1 therefore contribute to a better understanding
2 of SME performance.

3 **Hypotheses**

4 **Social Capital and Business Referrals**

5 The structure and strength of ties are
6 important dimensions of social capital (Adler
7 and Kwon 2002). Intuitively, having the
8 highest number of direct contacts would be
9 expected to result in the best access to
10 resources and to more referrals. However,
11 Burt (1992) contradicted this intuitive view,
12 arguing that the number of nonredundant con-
13 tacts is more important than the total number
14 of contacts. This led him to introduce the
15 concept of “structural holes,” which he defined
16 as gaps between nonredundant contacts. In
17 Figure 1, Ego’s network contains several struc-
18 tural holes. For example, Jack and Jane are
19 nonredundant contacts: Because there are no
20 ties between them, they connect Ego to differ-
21 ent others. On the other hand, Bob and Sue
22 are redundant contacts: Because they know
23 each other and belong to the same social
24 “clique,” they indirectly connect Ego to the
25 same contacts.


26
27 An SME CEO whose network contains a lot
28 of structural holes will be connected to many
29 different zones of the social structure, thereby
30 guaranteeing that information about his/her
31 firm is disseminated to a maximum number of
32 people. By contrast, a CEO with a very dense
33 network (in the extreme case, everyone knows
34 everyone else) will find it more difficult to
35 spread information about his/her company
36 beyond his/her network of direct contacts.

37 Numerous empirical studies have been
38 carried out to test this theory, some of which

specifically link structural holes in the CEO’s
network to SME performance. McEvily and
Zaheer (1999) found that structural holes had a
positive effect on a firm’s acquisition of strategic
capabilities, in particular because low redun-
dancy in the network offers access to broader
sources of knowledge. Similarly, in a study of
Indian entrepreneurial ventures, Vissa and
Chacar (2009) found that firm growth was
higher among entrepreneurial teams with struc-
tural holes in their advice networks. Following
an analysis of ventures in the open source
software industry, Stam and Elfring (2008)
reported that centrality, a measure that also
captures network structure, impacts firm
growth.

Overall, these studies recognized that struc-
tural holes have a positive impact on firm per-
formance, but they were unable to determine
whether this impact was due to the ability of
structural holes to provide a firm with access to
information and resources or to the fact that
structural holes promote broader dissemination
of favorable information and recommenda-
tions. As a result, it remains unclear whether
the impact on firm performance is due to an
information acquisition effect or an information
diffusion effect. However, studies in the field of
reputation building at work have produced
convincing findings that structural holes favor
the diffusion of favorable information. Follow-
ing a similar argument to that of structural
holes theory, Mehra et al. (2006) showed that a
manager’s leadership reputation is positively
influenced by his/her central position in friend-
ship networks within his/her organization.
Similarly, Wong and Boh (2010) found that
non-overlapping contacts lead to broader

39
40 **Figure 1**
41 **Illustration of the Concept of Structural Holes**
42



1 diffusion of information about a focal manager,
2 resulting in enhanced reputation.

3
4 *H1: The higher the number of structural holes*
5 *in an SME CEO's network, the more business*
6 *referrals he/she will obtain.*

7
8 Another important dimension of SME CEOs'
9 social capital is strength of ties, which is
10 a function of interaction frequency, dura-
11 tion, emotional intensity, and reciprocity
12 (Granovetter 1973; Zhou et al. 2009). Granovet-
13 ter's argument is that if a CEO has strong ties
14 with two persons who do not know each other,
15 it is highly probable that they will develop a
16 relationship over time (Granovetter 1973).
17 Applying this principle to all of a CEO's rela-
18 tionships leads to the conclusion that individu-
19 als with strong ties tend to belong to rather
20 dense networks in which resources circulate "in
21 a closed circuit." Hence, it would be advanta-
22 geous for an individual to create weak ties and
23 to establish relationships with people he/she
24 does not know and who belong to other social
25 groups.

26 This argument suggests that structural holes,
27 in Burt's sense, are more likely to exist between
28 weak ties than between strong ties. However,
29 other authors point out other reasons for the
30 impact of strength of ties and provide argu-
31 ments for a positive effect of strong ties
32 (Ingram and Roberts 2000; Uzzi and Lancaster
33 2003). According to these arguments, it is more
34 probable that a member of a CEO's network
35 will recommend the CEO's firm if the tie is
36 strong than if the tie is weak. First, a person
37 with a weak tie to a CEO is less likely to be
38 motivated to pass on information about the
39 CEO's firm, whereas a person with a strong tie
40 will generally be more motivated to support the
41 CEO (Krackhardt 1992). Second, people with
42 strong ties to a CEO often know what kind of
43 resources and competences the CEO possesses
44 (Borgatti and Cross 2003), increasing the prob-
45 ability that they will spread information about
46 the CEO. In contrast, a weak tie implies less
47 mutual knowledge and, probably, a smaller
48 amount of substantial information to spread.
49 Third, a person with whom a CEO has a strong
50 tie is more likely to introduce a "positive bias"
51 when spreading information about the CEO or
52 his/her firm, relaying only more favorable
53 aspects. This phenomenon is explained by peo-
54 ple's tendency to overestimate the qualities of
55 others with whom they have strong ties

because of the emotional components associ-
ated with such ties (Gershoff and Johar 2006).

These arguments may explain certain results
reported in the literature. For example, in a
qualitative study of 14 entrepreneurs, Jack
(2005) reported that those who were able to
build their firm's reputation mostly relied on
strong ties based on family and friends. Simi-
larly, in a study of medium-sized firms that
were selecting partners for international joint
ventures, Wong and Ellis (2002) found that
strong ties were more powerful than weak ties
in conveying information about potential
contacts.

H2: The stronger the ties in an SME CEO's
network, the more business referrals he/she
will obtain.

Positive Personality and Business Referrals

By viewing networks as effective channels
for spreading information, the individual per-
spective of social capital provides a framework
for explaining how SMEs obtain business refer-
rals. The better a CEO's network, the better the
diffusion of information. However, the impact
of information that travels through the network
will differ according to whether it is favorable
or unfavorable (Burt 2005). Because the
opinion of a person within a CEO's network
will depend on the CEO's characteristics and
behavior, his/her personality traits should be
taken into account alongside his/her personal
networks (Baron and Markman 2000; Burt
2005). Whether or not favorable information is
likely to circulate within the social structure
will depend on these individual traits.

We consider personality traits to be funda-
mental characteristics of CEOs and believe that
differences in personality traits between SME
CEOs lead to differences in behavior. Several
studies support this claim. For example, a
CEO's personality has been shown to influence
his/her company's chances of survival
(Ciavarella et al. 2004), and a CEO's entrepre-
neurial orientation to determine firm perfor-
mance (Becherer and Maurer 1999; Covin and
Slevin 1989). Consistently, the present study
follows the idea that a CEO's personality influ-
ences behaviors that affect both his/her SME
and people's opinions in the network—which
will ultimately impact business referrals.

Of the many models that characterize per-
sonality traits, we selected four traits from the

1 “big five” model (Costa and McCrae 1992;
2 Digman 1990; Zhao and Seibert 2006): agree-
3 ableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and
4 openness to experience. These traits, which
5 have been extensively tested by psychologists,
6 have the advantage of providing a clear distinc-
7 tion between the personality aspects that are
8 likely to be interpreted either very negatively or
9 very positively by the people in contact with a
10 CEO.¹ Moreover, they have already been suc-
11 cessfully applied to the context of entrepre-
12 neurship (Zhao and Seibert 2006).

13 Based on Zhao and Seibert (2006), these
14 four traits can be defined as follows. *Agreeable-*
15 *ness* indicates whether a person is considered
16 trustworthy, altruistic, and likely to take care of
17 others, or, on the contrary, manipulative, self-
18 centered, wary, and lacking compassion. *Con-*
19 *scientiousness* indicates a person’s degree of
20 organization, his/her perseverance and motiva-
21 tion to work. People with low *conscientious-*
22 *ness* scores are disorganized and quickly
23 discouraged. *Extraversion* describes the ten-
24 dency to turn to the outside world. Extraverted
25 people are dominant, energetic, active, talk-
26 ative, and enthusiastic; they enjoy group life
27 and seek stimulation through contact with
28 others. Introverted people prefer to spend
29 more time alone and are rather reserved and
30 independent. *Openness to experience* measures
31 curiosity and willingness to search for new
32 experiences and to explore original ideas.
33 People with high scores on this dimension are
34 creative, innovative, imaginative, thoughtful,
35 and nonconventional.

36 Several studies have addressed the impact of
37 these personality dimensions on behavior (Lee,
38 Ashton, and Shin 2005; Paunonen 2003), on
39 social status (Anderson et al. 2001), and on
40 performance at work (Hurtz and Donovan 2000;
41 Judge and Ilies 2002; Ones et al. 2007). Meta-
42 analyses have shown that conscientiousness is a
43 particularly important explanatory factor (Judge
44 and Ilies 2002; Ones et al. 2007). When the other
45 four dimensions operate, it is generally in a
46 similar direction: They correlate positively with
47 individual performance. However, most studies
48 have noted performance in terms of evaluations
49
50

made by supervisors (see the review by Ones
et al. 2007). Thus, a person’s personality is likely
to affect his/her performance but may also influ-
ence how he/she is judged by other people. The
notion that performance does not exist “in itself”
but only through subjective evaluations is par-
ticularly relevant to our specific context of study:
Because they lack objective information, poten-
tial customers of a focal SME have to build an
opinion based on their subjective perception of
potential performance.

This consideration is consistent with another
stream of research that shows that personality
traits are subject to perception and strongly
contribute to the types of judgment others
make. For example, in a study of the formation
of impressions at work, Flynn, Chatman, and
Spataro (2001) found that people who are
demographically different from their coworkers
engendered more negative impressions.
However, those who had high extraversion and
self-monitoring scores engendered more posi-
tive impressions than those with low scores for
these traits. Similarly, Scott and Judge (2009)
found that high core self-evaluations (a higher-
order trait combining traits such as self-efficacy
and self-esteem) were a factor of popularity
in the workplace. On the contrary, individuals
with low core self-evaluations were appraised
negatively by others, resulting in lower
popularity.

Taken together, these arguments suggest
two complementary ideas: (1) personality traits
are subject to perceptions by others and these
perceptions partly drive their judgments; and
(2) some traits are typically “positive personal-
ity traits” that lead to more favorable judg-
ments, resulting in the circulation of positive
information through personal relationships. In
the case of SME CEOs, this should ultimately
result in more business referrals. Thus:

*H3a: The more an SME CEO is agreeable, the
more business referrals he/she will obtain.*

*H3b: The more an SME CEO is conscientious,
the more business referrals he/she will
obtain.*

¹We did not select emotional stability, the fifth dimension of the big five, as previous research on how others make judgments based on personality traits has shown that emotional stability is the least observable trait. This is because emotional stability does not produce clear behavioral manifestations that can be observed in social interactions (Funder and Sneed 1993; Vazire 2010). Consequently, there is no theoretical foundation for assuming that this trait will be translated into favorable information diffusion.

1 *H3c: The more an SME CEO is extraverted, the*
2 *more business referrals he/she will obtain.*

3
4 *H3d: The more an SME CEO is open to experi-*
5 *ence, the more business referrals he/she will*
6 *obtain.*

7
8 **Positive Personality as a Contingent**
9 **Factor of Social Capital**

10 A growing body of literature suggests that
11 the effect of social capital is linked to the char-
12 acteristics of individuals. Burt (1992) and Ibarra
13 (1992) found that women get less advantage
14 than men from similar network positions. In
15 the field of entrepreneurship, Stam and Elfring
16 (2008) reported that centrality and the bridging
17 ties connecting a founding team to other indus-
18 tries have a significant effect on business per-
19 formance, but the strength of this effect
20 depends on the founding team's level of entre-
21 preneurial orientation. Similarly, Anderson
22 (2008) reported that the average tie strength
23 and the number of structural holes in a man-
24 ager's network have a positive impact on the
25 amount and diversity of information the man-
26 ager can obtain, but this impact is stronger
27 among managers with a high need for cogni-
28 tion. Similarly, Baer (2010) and Zhou et al.
29 (2009) found that the impact of weak ties was
30 moderated by personality traits (openness to
31 experience and conformity, respectively).
32 Extrapolating these findings to business refer-
33 rals suggests that the amount of business refer-
34 rals an SME CEO obtains from his/her network
35 will depend on his/her personality traits.²

36 As already stated, some personality traits are
37 perceived more positively than others (Scott and
38 Judge 2009), and traits that are considered
39 positive are more likely to lead to favorable
40 information about a CEO being communicated
41 along social ties. Thus, a social network that
42 ensures good diffusion of information (struc-
43 tural holes and strong ties) may provide even
44 greater benefits if the CEO at the hub of this
45 network has personality traits that are per-
46 ceived as positive. However, networks are not
47
48

neutral vehicles for diffusing information, as
the information they transmit tends to be
attenuated or distorted during the diffusion
process.

This attenuation and distortion are influenced
by both structural holes and strong ties. Neg-
ative aspects of ego's personality circulate more
easily and are more likely to become known by
all the people linked to ego when ego is at the
center of a dense network. In addition, the
"echo" phenomenon (Burt 2005) leads to nega-
tive opinions being amplified and exaggerated
during the circulation process. In Figure 1, the
tie between Bob and Sue makes it possible for
negative information to circulate from one to the
other and to become amplified during conversa-
tions. On the contrary, the absence of a tie
between Jane and Jack may be beneficial to ego.
For example, a CEO with very positive person-
ality traits will benefit from the lack of a tie
between Jane and Jack because they will spread
information through different parts of the social
structure. However, a CEO with very negative
personality traits will benefit even more from
this situation because the lack of a tie between
Jane and Jack will attenuate the negative signal
given by negative personality, as it cannot
become a topic of conversation in the CEO's
network. There can be no contagion from Jane
to Jack, and no possibility for amplification
through "echo" effects, as they do not know
each other. Hence, it may be more beneficial for
CEOs with negative personality traits to have
numerous structural holes in their networks.

H4a: The positive relationship between struc-
tural holes and business referrals is stronger
when an SME CEO is low on agreeableness.

H4b: The positive relationship between
structural holes and business referrals is
stronger when an SME CEO is low on
conscientiousness.

H4c: The positive relationship between struc-
tural holes and business referrals is

49 ²Some authors focus on personality as an antecedent of social capital rather than as a moderator (Kalish and
50 Robbins 2006; Kim and Kim 2007; Klein et al. 2004; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 2001; Oh and Kilduff 2008;
51 Sasovova et al. 2010). Positioning personality as a moderator or an antecedent seems to depend on the exact
52 trait being considered. Self-monitoring ("the extent to which individuals are willing and able to monitor and
53 control their self-expressions in social situations," Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 2001, p. 124) was found to be
54 an antecedent in five of the six previously cited studies, but other traits have received very limited attention
55 as antecedents.

stronger when an SME CEO is low on extraversion.

H4d: The positive relationship between structural holes and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on openness to experience.

As already stated, a strong tie creates a deliberate or unconscious tendency for a contact to overestimate the qualities of a focal actor and to distort information (Gershoff and Johar 2006). Similarly, a strong tie may enhance the motivation for a contact to provide support and help to ego, regardless of what it may cost (energy, time, or legitimacy). In such a situation, a CEO with very positive personality traits might benefit from strong ties, as they will enhance the diffusion of positive information and thereby reinforce an already positive signal. However, CEOs with very negative personality traits might benefit even more because contacts with strong ties will tend to ignore negative signals and filter and distort information through a positively biased schema before passing it on to other contacts. As a result, they will attenuate the negativity of the signal. On the contrary, negative information that travels along weak ties is more likely to be transferred “as is,” leading to poor outcomes in terms of business referrals. Consequently, strength of ties is likely to have the biggest effect on referrals for CEOs with low scores on positive personality traits.

H5a: The positive relationship between strength of ties and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on agreeableness.

H5b: The positive relationship between strength of ties and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on conscientiousness.

H5c: The positive relationship between strength of ties and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on extraversion.

H5d: The positive relationship between strength of ties and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on openness to experience.

Methodology

Data

We tested our hypotheses on a sample of CEOs of manufacturing SMEs³ in Haute-Savoie, France. Restricting a study’s scope to one geographical area is common practice in the field (e.g., Camisón and Villar-López 2010; Madrid-Guijarro, Garcia, and Van Auken 2009; Niskanen and Niskanen 2010; Van Auken, Kaufmann, and Herrmann 2009) because it facilitates the data collection process. More importantly, it ensures relatively homogeneous environmental conditions, thereby minimizing the role of extraneous variables. This aspect is particularly important in studies of social capital (Aarstad, Haugland, and Greve 2010; McEvily and Zaheer 1999; Molina-Morales and Martinez-Fernandez 2010), as “the patterns of social capital are strongly conditioned by the social context where business partners are embedded” (Pirolo and Presutti 2010, p. 205).

The area we selected has one predominant cluster, the Arve Valley, which has a high density of small subcontracting firms and the largest concentration of precision engineering companies in Europe. These firms operate in a business-to-business environment, manufacturing mostly nonstandard products and responding to the specific needs of corporate customers, such as original equipment manufacturers in the automotive or aerospace industries. In this type of environment, purchasing decisions are often quite complex (Shao et al. 2008) and businesses need more refined and reliable information than what is publicly available. These decisions are also often risky due to high uncertainty, which generates a need for particularly trustworthy sources of information (Uzzi 1997). As a result, business referrals in this context should be of particular importance for customer acquisition. Another feature of this area is that it has been described as a “Marshallian district,” with a long tradition of interpersonal relationships acting as cement for interfirm collaboration (Courlet, Pecqueur, and Soulage 1993). It has also received regular financial support from national, regional, and local authorities in order to promote cooperation. These characteristics should clearly facilitate information circulation and encourage relying on informal sources to assess the reliability of other firms.

³We used the European Union’s definition of an SME as a firm with fewer than 250 employees.

Table 1
Sample Characteristics

	Number	Percentage
Industry		
Metal products	103	25.25
Industrial machinery	55	13.48
Electronic and electrical equipment	98	24.02
Chemicals, rubber & plastic products	75	18.38
Other manufacturing industries	77	18.87
Firm size (employees)		
Fewer than 10	180	44.12
10 to 50	160	39.22
50 to 250	68	16.67
CEO education		
Graduate degree	195	47.79
Undergraduate degree	117	28.68
No undergraduate degree	96	23.53
CEO gender		
Women	82	20.10
Men	326	79.90
CEO tenure (number of years with the company)		
Less than 2	19	4.66
2 to 5	63	15.44
5 to 10	93	22.79
More than 10	233	57.11
Mean	12.618	
Standard deviation	9.2741	

CEO, chief executive officer.

In December 2007, we sent an invitation to participate in the study to the CEOs of the 1,581 manufacturing SMEs listed in the databases of the Haute-Savoie Chamber of Commerce and Thésame, an Arve Valley organization that provides support to local firms in the metal products, mechanical engineering, and electronics industries. The invitation e-mail included a cover letter explaining that the study was supported by the Chamber of Commerce and Thésame. After two follow-up e-mails, we received 535 completed questionnaires, 427 of which were completed by respondents who identified themselves as the CEOs of their firm. We removed a further 19 questionnaires from the sample due to missing data, which left us with a database of 408 CEOs. This gave a final response rate of 25.81%, which is quite satisfactory compared with standards in the field for this type of study (Bartholomew and Smith 2006; Baruch and Hotlom 2008).

As shown in Table 1, most of the respondents had a graduate degree (47.79%), were male (79.90 percent), and had had long tenure with their company (more than 10 years for 57.11% of them). There were 44.12 percent of the firms in the sample that had fewer than 10 employees, 39.22 percent had between 10 and 49 employees, and 16.67 percent had between 50 and 249 employees. Most of the firms operated in the metal products (25.25 percent) or electronics industries (24.02 percent), followed by the chemical (18.38 percent) and industrial machinery (13.48 percent) industries. A comparison between the composition of the final sample and the parent population did not show any statistically significant differences in terms of firm size and industry.

Measures

Business Referrals. We applied a newly developed scale that uses respondents' reports to

capture the degree to which customer acquisition relies on referrals. We pretested an initial list of items with eight researchers in management and with a group of 10 SME CEOs taken from the parent population. Purification of the initial set resulted in a three-item scale (translated from French): “People recommend my company to customers,” “People strongly advise other firms to do business with my company,” “My company obtains contracts thanks to favorable word of mouth.” Respondents rated how much they agreed with each item on a six-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” For the data collected, the scale had a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of 0.779.⁴ To the best of our knowledge, the only previous study to have measured self-assessed levels of business referrals is Seevers, Skinner, and Dahlstrom (2010), which was published after we had collected our data. Excepting the specific wording for their target population (retail buyers in the golf industry), Seevers et al.’s items are very similar to ours.

Name Generators. We used name generators to build the variables relating to the respondents’ networks. This method requires respondents to identify the people with whom they have contact on various levels (e.g., friendship or advice). In line with previous studies (Burt 1992; Rodan and Galunic 2004), we used five name generators. Respondents were asked to give the names or initials of people they have contact with for (1) obtaining advice before making important decisions, (2) exchanging information on business trends and competition, (3) recruiting employees, and (4) finding solutions to technical problems. The fifth generator was a more open heading: “anybody you consider important for the management of your business and who did not fall into the previous categories.” Each respondent could enter up to 18 names, and for each name the respondent was expected to answer a number of questions.

Structural Holes. Structural holes can be measured in several ways; however, the most widely used measurement is aggregate constraint. It indicates the extent to which the relationships in a focal actor’s network lead, directly or indirectly, to the same people (Burt

1992, pp. 54–55). In other words, it expresses the extent to which a focal actor is surrounded by individuals who have connections with other people in the network. In this respect, it is strongly correlated with network density.

Burt (1992) defined the constraint exerted by an alter j on a focal actor i as:

$$c_{ij} = \left(p_{ij} + \sum_q p_{iq} p_{qj} \right)^2, \quad q \neq i, j$$

where p_{ij} is the proportion of all relations that contact j represents in i ’s network. $\sum_q p_{iq} p_{qj}$ is the portion of i ’s relations with other contacts who are in turn connected to j . It gives a measure of the importance of j in i ’s network. If this sum is very high, it means that the presence of j in i ’s network considerably reduces the number of structural holes. The aggregate constraint is obtained by summing all the constraints exerted by each individual alter in ego’s network:

$$c_i = \sum_j c_{ij}, \quad i \neq j$$

In order to compute c_{ij} , we asked each respondent to indicate whether a pair of his/her contacts was connected, and to do this for every pair of contacts. These data were then converted into constraint values using UCINET VI software (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). If structural holes positively impact business referrals (as postulated in H1), then constraint should negatively impact this variable. Because constraint can range between 0 and 1, and in order to facilitate interpretation, we used 1—constraint to directly measure structural holes. This is in line with previous research (McEvily and Zaheer 1999; Rodan and Galunic 2004).

Tie Strength. Of the many measures that have been devised to assess tie strength (Marsden and Campbell 1984), the most commonly used are frequency of interactions and emotional closeness. However, Marsden and Campbell (1984) showed that emotional closeness gives higher validity than frequency of interactions because this latter variable is often a correlate

⁴See Appendices for the principal components analysis of business referrals.

of elements that are not connected with tie strength (e.g., geographical proximity). Therefore, we used emotional closeness in the present study. Our data collection tool asked respondents to position each of their listed contacts on a Likert scale ranging from “distant” to “especially close” (Burt 1992). A respondent’s “strength of ties” score was the average of the scores obtained for all the contacts he/she listed.

Personality Traits. The “big five” scales have been frequently tested and validated. The International Personality Item Pool website contains translations of the most frequently used items in 10 languages (Goldberg 1999). We selected six items for each dimension, so as to avoid cluttering the questionnaire and to maximize the response rate. Our pretests made it possible to ensure that all the items were well understood. Thus, we retained four personality variables: agreeableness ($\alpha = 0.812$), conscientiousness ($\alpha = 0.774$), extraversion ($\alpha = 0.760$), and openness to experience ($\alpha = 0.757$).

Controls. We controlled for several variables capturing key differences across SMEs. Firm size was measured in terms of number of employees, with the SMEs being divided into three categories: fewer than 10 employees, from 10 to 50 employees, and more than 50 employees. Two dichotomous variables were created: “fewer than 10 employees” and “from 10 to 50 employees.” We also controlled for industry, using NES⁵ codes. We created a dichotomous variable for each category of industries mentioned in Table 1 (except “other manufacturing industries”). Other items on the questionnaire were used to measure characteristics of the CEOs, such as gender, tenure (number of years with the company), and education, for which we distinguished three categories (graduate degree, undergraduate degree, no degree). We used “graduate degree” and “undergraduate degree” as two dichotomous control variables.

Results

The summary statistics and correlation matrix for all the variables are presented in Table 2. The hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regressions.⁶

The Direct Effects of Social Capital and Personality

With the stepwise introduction of the variables according to a hierarchical logic of regression, adding network variables (Model 2, Table 3) and then personality variables (Model 3) significantly enhanced the explanatory power of the model.

Our results support H1 and H2 (Model 2) with both stronger ties and larger numbers of structural holes in a CEO’s network leading to more business referrals. This second result is in line with Burt (1992). H3 is also supported, as Agreeableness (H3a), Conscientiousness (H3b), Extraversion (H3c), and Openness to Experience (H3d) have a significant impact on business referrals. Overall, business referrals depend on the extent to which information about a CEO spreads through his/her personal network and on the nature of this information.

Personality Moderating the Effect of Social Capital

Model 4 (Table 3) includes all the variables that were introduced in the previous models, together with the interactions between the personality and network variables.⁷ One personality trait—conscientiousness—significantly moderates the effect on business referrals of both structural holes and strength of ties. This particularity of conscientiousness is consistent with previous research. Of the “big five” traits, conscientiousness has been found to be the most important factor in individual performance (Judge and Ilies 2002; Ones et al. 2007). This trait signals reliability, motivation to fulfill commitments, and willingness to pay attention to detail, and these aspects may be more important in the context of business relations than the other traits (agreeableness, extraversion, and openness to experience).

⁵NES codes are a standard classification used by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE 2010).

⁶In line with Jaccard and Turrissi (2003), we mean centered network and personality variables before processing the data, in order to avoid multicollinearity problems.

⁷Correlations between network variables and personality traits are extremely weak (–11.2 percent for the strongest correlation). These results provide additional evidence that personality traits should not be considered as antecedents. This is line with recent works (Anderson 2008; Baer 2010; Zhou et al. 2009).

Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1 Business referrals	1																
2 Gender (1 = woman)	-0.022	1															
3 Tenure (ln)	-0.045	-0.060	1														
4 Graduate degree	-0.013	-0.048	-0.190***	1													
5 Undergraduate degree	-0.006	0.091*	0.047	-0.620***	1												
6 Metal products	0.009	0.000	0.164***	-0.065	-0.021	1											
7 Industrial machinery	0.036	-0.063	-0.045	-0.015	0.028	-0.105**	1										
8 Electronic and electrical equipment	0.015	-0.122**	0.005	0.068	-0.089*	-0.140***	-0.097**	1									
9 Chemicals, rubber and plastic products	-0.140***	-0.017	0.024	0.047	-0.15	-0.125**	-0.087*	-0.115**	1								
10 Fewer than 10 employees	-0.016	0.176***	-0.192***	-0.023	-0.026	-0.256***	-0.040	0.041	-0.034	1							
11 10 to 50 employees	-0.028	-0.103**	0.127***	-0.053	0.034	0.179***	0.008	0.006	0.049	-0.743***	1						
12 Structural holes	0.056	-0.042	-0.095*	0.070	-0.030	0.089*	-0.053	-0.091*	-0.003	-0.067	0.070	1					
13 Strength of ties	0.127***	0.031	0.048	0.034	-0.066	-0.006	-0.058	0.031	0.000	0.100**	-0.076	-0.343***	1				
14 Agreeableness	0.230***	0.061	-0.110**	-0.027	-0.030	0.047	0.000	-0.047	-0.086*	0.028	-0.069	-0.051	0.099**	1			
15 Conscientiousness	0.152***	0.094*	-0.083*	-0.064	0.032	-0.065	0.036	-0.007	-0.089*	0.074	-0.088*	0.007	-0.019	-0.189***	1		
16 Extraversion	0.264***	0.014	-0.113**	0.011	-0.042	0.036	0.052	-0.032	-0.040	-0.003	-0.049	0.037	0.112**	0.206***	0.093*	1	
17 Openness to experience	0.344***	-0.018	-0.081*	0.130***	-0.094*	0.027	0.045	-0.020	-0.043	0.092*	-0.049	-0.029	0.085*	0.224***	0.084	0.166***	1
N	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408	408
Mean	0.000	0.201	0.960	0.478	0.287	0.252	0.135	0.240	0.184	0.441	0.392	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Standard deviation	1.000	0.398	0.380	0.500	0.457	0.338	0.252	0.319	0.291	0.498	0.490	0.196	0.530	0.978	0.981	1.003	0.987

[12]

[13]

Table 3
Hierarchical Regression Analysis

Business referrals (standardized coefficients, with Student statistics in brackets)^a

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gender (1 = woman)	-0.015 (-0.286)	-0.012 (-0.239)	-0.011 (-0.245)	-0.002 (-0.033)
Tenure	-0.055 (-1.042)	-0.055 (-1.048)	-0.009 (-0.184)	-0.019 (-0.392)
Graduate degree	-0.039 (-0.584)	-0.049 (-0.746)	-0.054 (-0.893)	-0.068 (-1.110)
Undergraduate degree	-0.041 (-0.638)	-0.039 (-0.613)	-0.001 (-0.015)	-0.024 (-0.411)
Metal products	0.000 (0.008)	-0.010 (-0.194)	-0.037 (-0.767)	-0.060 (-1.247)
Industrial machinery	0.021 (0.408)	0.032 (0.633)	0.015 (0.323)	0.022 (0.490)
Electronic and electrical equipment	0.007 (0.129)	0.013 (0.257)	0.030 (0.636)	0.018 (0.375)
Chemicals, rubber and plastic products	-0.132** (-2.575)	-0.128** (-2.525)	-0.095** (-2.129)	-0.098** (-2.062)
Fewer than 10 employees	-0.082 (-1.041)	-0.101 (-1.295)	-0.114 (-1.575)	-0.111 (-1.567)
10 to 50 employees	-0.080 (-1.068)	-0.088 (-1.180)	-0.070 (-1.022)	-0.069 (-1.010)
Structural holes		0.113** (2.099)	0.095* (1.926)	0.087* (1.745)
Strength of ties		0.174*** (3.254)	0.110** (2.233)	0.120** (2.451)
Agreeableness			0.109** (2.273)	0.089* (1.825)
Conscientiousness			0.102** (2.194)	0.077* (1.678)
Extraversion			0.163*** (3.481)	0.149*** (3.151)
Openness to experience			0.287*** (6.062)	0.325*** (6.838)
Strength of ties × agreeableness				-0.077 (-1.458)
Strength of ties × conscientiousness				-0.120** (-2.330)
Strength of ties × extraversion				-0.030 (-0.583)
Strength of ties × openness to experience				0.067 (1.284)
Structural holes × agreeableness				-0.029 (-0.555)
Structural holes × conscientiousness				-0.219*** (-4.158)
Structural holes × extraversion				0.001 (0.011)
Structural holes × openness to experience				-0.006 (-0.112)
<i>R</i> ²	0.026	0.054	0.219	0.263
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.001	0.025	0.187	0.217
<i>R</i> ² variation	0.026	0.028	0.166	0.043
Standard error estimate	0.995	0.984	0.898	0.882
<i>F</i>	1.056	1.861**	6.852***	5.677***
<i>N</i>	408	408	408	408

^aStudent's *t* significance: ****p* < .01; ***p* < .05; **p* < .10.

Figure 2
Interaction Effect between Structural Holes and Conscientiousness




Figure 2 depicts the interaction effects graphically (based on Aiken and West 1991). These graphs use the nonstandardized coefficients to establish the regression slope, considering three cases: a high value for the moderating variable (one standard deviation [S.D.] above the mean), a low value for the moderating variable (one S.D. below the mean), and a value equal to the mean for the moderating variable.

The overall positive effect on business referrals of both structural holes and strength of ties was stronger among CEOs with lower conscientiousness. Hence, conscientiousness mitigates the positive effect of social capital, which indicates that networks are a source of information distortion and attenuation, as well as a source of information diffusion. CEOs with low conscientiousness (a signal that is negative for business) will get more business referrals if they have a network that is rich in structural holes because structural holes dampen the diffusion of negative signals. As the individuals in a CEO's network do not know each other, the negative signal cannot become a topic of conversation and will therefore lose its intensity.

On the contrary, a low level of structural holes (high density and redundancy in the network) leads to intense circulation of the negative signal. The fact that information circulates very rapidly in a dense network will result in negative aspects being widely known by people connected to the CEO. Moreover, as well as spreading negative opinions, talk amplifies

and exaggerates them (Burt 2005). In contrast, a very conscientious CEO will benefit from the amplification and exaggeration of opinions through a dense network (see the slightly negative slope for very conscientious individuals) because positive personality signals will be transmitted and amplified via conversations between individuals who know the CEO as well as each other.


We also found support for an interaction between strength of ties and conscientiousness. The impact of strength of ties was very high among CEOs with low conscientiousness and absent among CEOs with high conscientiousness. CEOs with low conscientiousness obtained more business referrals when they had strong ties (on the right in Figure 3) and fewer business referrals when they had mainly weak ties. On the contrary, very conscientious CEOs obtained similar levels of business referrals no matter how strong (or weak) the ties in their networks. This is consistent with the notion that low conscientiousness is a negative signal that limits the diffusion of favorable information. When such negative information is transmitted along weak ties, it is likely to be transferred "as is." On the other hand, when it travels along strong ties, it is likely to be filtered and positively biased.

Table 4 summarizes the empirical support found for our hypotheses.

Discussion

This study examined how a CEO's social capital and personality favor business referrals.

Figure 3
Interaction Effect between Strength of Ties and Conscientiousness



Colour online. B&W in print.

In line with the individual approach to social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002; Burt 1992), we view social ties as important vehicles for spreading first-hand information about the CEO to potential customers (Uzzi 1997). Our findings offer several contributions. From a theoretical point of view, they highlight the relationship between information diffusion and networks that are rich in structural holes, whereas previous research focused on the role of this variable for SMEs in terms of information acquisition (McEvily and Zaheer 1999). Similarly, although strength of ties has been studied as an important variable affecting information acquisition (Julien, Andriambelason, and Ramangalahy 2004; McEvily and Zaheer 1999), we provide evidence that it plays an important role in information diffusion. Thus, our study provides an original contribution to the debate over the “strength of strong ties” (Hansen 1999) versus the “strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1973).

Our research also contributes to current efforts to move beyond a “universal” theory of social capital. In line with a very recent stream of research (Anderson 2008; Baer 2010; Zhou et al. 2009), we argue that the value of social capital is contingent on personality. Building on research into the perception of personality traits (Flynn, Chatman, and Spataro 2001; Scott and Judge 2009), we tested a model in which a CEO’s personality is a signal that is interpreted and referred to by contacts in his/her personal network. We found that positive personality

traits have a direct positive effect on referrals. In addition, one of these personality traits, conscientiousness, moderates the impact of social capital. Conscientiousness signals that a focal actor is a reliable and hard-working person, and therefore a good job performer (Judge and Ilies 2002; Ones et al. 2007). Thus, it is not surprising that the conscientiousness of a CEO provides potential customers with a particularly valuable indication of his/her expected reliability in business.

A much more insightful finding lies in the way conscientiousness moderates the effect of social capital. Social capital (strong ties and structural holes) appears to be very beneficial for CEOs with low conscientiousness but almost neutral for CEOs with high conscientiousness. In other words, rather than intensifying the benefits accruing from high conscientiousness, social capital compensates for the negative reputation effect that low conscientiousness could create. Strong ties seem to involve a certain “bias” in the spread of information, with contacts disseminating favorable information and endorsing a CEO even when the initial signal is negative. Similarly, structural holes between contacts can prevent negative signals being propagated contagiously from one group of contacts to another, thereby reducing the likelihood of “echo” effects. This is very beneficial for CEOs with low conscientiousness, but not particularly advantageous for CEOs with high conscientiousness. Taken together, these results indicate that social ties

Table 4
Synopsis of Results

Direct effect of social capital on business referrals

Direct effect of social capital on business referrals

H1: The higher the number of structural holes in an SME CEO's network, the more business referrals he/she will obtain. Supported

H2: The stronger the ties in an SME CEO's network, the more business referrals he/she will obtain. Supported

Direct effect of positive personality on business referrals

H3a: The more an SME CEO is agreeable, the more business referrals he/she will obtain. Supported

H3b: The more an SME CEO is conscientious, the more business referrals he/she will obtain. Supported

H3c: The more an SME CEO is extraverted, the more business referrals he/she will obtain. Supported

H3d: The more an SME CEO is open to experience, the more business referrals he/she will obtain. Supported

Positive personality moderating the effect of social capital

Structural holes

H4a: The positive relationship between structural holes and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on agreeableness. Not supported

H4b: The positive relationship between structural holes and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on conscientiousness. Supported

H4c: The positive relationship between structural holes and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on extraversion. Not supported

H4d: The positive relationship between structural holes and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on openness to experience. Not supported

Strength of ties

H5a: The positive relationship between strength of ties and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on agreeableness. Not supported

H5b: The positive relationship between strength of ties and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on conscientiousness. Supported

H5c: The positive relationship between strength of ties and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on extraversion. Not supported

H5d: The positive relationship between strength of ties and business referrals is stronger when an SME CEO is low on openness to experience. Not supported

CEO, chief executive officer; SME, small and medium-sized enterprise.

must be seen as channels that alter information as it travels through them, thereby offering a more complex view of the individual approach to social capital.

These findings on personality as a contingent factor open new research avenues about the relationships between social capital and personality. Some studies have taken a different approach from ours, focusing on personality as an antecedent of social capital, rather

than as a moderator. They found that traits such as self-monitoring (e.g., Kim and Kim 2007; Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass 2001; Oh and Kilduff 2008; Sasovova et al. 2010) or neuroticism (Kalish and Robbins 2006; Klein et al. 2004) lead to specific structures of personal networks. The coexistence of these studies with approaches positing other traits as moderators (Anderson 2008; Baer 2010; Zhou et al. 2009) reveals a need for theoretical

1 clarification. Future research should consider
2 models including some traits as antecedents of
3 social capital (in particular, those capturing
4 skills for or orientation toward socialization,
5 e.g., self-monitoring) and other traits as mod-
6 erators (those that are independent from
7 socialization and more relevant to task-related
8 dimensions, e.g., openness to experience or
9 conscientiousness).

10 Future research should also examine the
11 processes through which a person's opinion
12 makes him/her more or less likely to recom-
13 mend a CEO. This could be done by collecting
14 information from CEOs' social contacts, rather
15 than from CEOs themselves. Such studies
16 would also address one of the limitations of the
17 present study and therefore strengthen the
18 validity of our results. Although relying on the
19 self-evaluation of CEOs to assess business refer-
20 rals is now a well-established approach
21 (Seevers, Skinner, and Dahlstrom 2010), it
22 entails some risk of bias due to differences in
23 perceptions.

24 Finally, further research is needed before
25 our results can be generalized. As in any
26 survey, a limited response rate entails a risk of
27 poor fit between the sample and the parent
28 population. Although our response rate was
29 satisfactory compared with standards in the
30 field (Bartholomew and Smith 2006; Baruch
31 and Hotlom 2008), we checked for possible
32 differences between respondent and nonre-
33 spondent firms. Our analyses revealed no sig-
34 nificant differences in terms of industry and
35 firm size, suggesting that our sample is repre-
36 sentative of the parent population. The gener-
37 alizability of the results from this population to
38 other contexts is less clear. We studied manu-
39 facturing SMEs operating in a business-to-
40 business environment, where informal sources
41 of information about a firm are particularly
42 valuable in the process of making purchasing
43 decisions. Similar studies in the context of
44 much simpler purchasing decisions may lead to
45 very different results.

46 In a similar vein, the benefits of individual
47 social capital are highly dependent on the
48 social context at a broader level (Adler and
49 Kwon 2002) and our findings are based on a
50 geographically restricted industrial cluster,
51 as is the case for many other studies of social
52 capital among SMEs (Molina-Morales and
53 Martinez-Fernandez 2010; Pirolo and Presutti
54 2010). Our results should therefore be inter-
55 preted in the light of the particular social

context of our study. In clusters, which are
characterized by higher mutual trust and coop-
eration (Chetty and Agndal 2008; Cooke,
Clifton, and Oleaga 2005), the observed ben-
efits of individual social capital (our research
question) may be fueled by the preexisting
high level of collective social capital (our
context). Moreover, local institutions usually
play an important part in promoting collabora-
tion and provide resources to make this pos-
sible (Fromhold-Eisebith 2005; Gilly and Wallet
2001). Another aspect that makes clusters
favorable environments for business referrals
through social ties is that physical proximity
and collocation make it easier for CEOs to have
frequent face-to-face interactions (Chetty and
Agndal 2008). Therefore, it would be interest-
ing to replicate our study in areas with a much
lower concentration of SMEs, less specializa-
tion, and less active local institutions. In such
contexts, it would be reasonable to hypothesize
that individual social capital would have a
lower impact on business referrals due to the
absence of collective social capital. A compari-
son of two areas would contribute to a better
understanding of how levels of social capital
(individual and collective) interact, an aspect
that was pinpointed by Ibarra, Kilduff, and Tsai
(2005) as one of the future challenges in the
field.

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Appendix

Quality of Representation for Business Referrals

Retained items	Cos²	Var	α
"People recommend my company to customers"	0.780	70%	0.779
"People strongly advise other firms to do business with my company"	0.747		
"My company obtains contracts thanks to favorable word of mouth"	0.580		

Quality of Representation for Agreeableness

Retained item label	Cos²	Var	α
"I am interested in people"	0.569	57%	0.812
"I sympathize with other people's feelings"	0.561		
"I make time for others"	0.624		
"I feel others' emotions"	0.591		
"I make people feel at ease"	0.514		

Quality of Representation for Conscientiousness

Retained item label	Cos²	Var	α
"I usually put things back in their proper place"	0.744	69%	0.774
"I pay attention to detail"	0.598		
"I like order"	0.733		

Quality of Representation for Extraversion

Item label	Cos²	Var	α
"I do not talk a lot"	0.636	58%	0.760
"I keep in the background"	0.610		
"I start conversations"	0.532		
"I talk to a lot of different people at parties"	0.554		

Quality of Representation for Openness to Experience

Item label	Cos²	Var	α
"I have a vivid imagination"	0.715	68%	0.757
"I have excellent ideas"	0.689		
"I am quick to understand things"	0.639		

AUTHOR QUERY FORM

Dear Author,

During the preparation of your manuscript for publication, the questions listed below have arisen. Please attend to these matters and return this form with your proof.

Many thanks for your assistance.

Query References	Query	Remarks
1	AUTHOR: Please confirm that the article title, authors, address, correspondence and abstract copied from the export email and metadata are correct.	
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8	AUTHOR: Please check this website address and confirm that it is correct. (Please note that it is the responsibility of the author(s) to ensure that all URLs given in this article are correct and useable.)	
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
Query References	Query	Remarks
12	AUTHOR: Please supply definitions for the symbols “*, **, ***” in Table 2.	
13	AUTHOR: Please confirm that the content of the 2nd column and 13th row is correct. And please confirm that Table 2 has been combined correctly.	

USING e-ANNOTATION TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC PROOF CORRECTION


Required software to e-Annotate PDFs: Adobe Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader (version 8.0 or above). (Note that this document uses screenshots from Adobe Reader X)

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Once you have Acrobat Reader open on your computer, click on the [Comment](#) tab at the right of the toolbar:



This will open up a panel down the right side of the document. The majority of tools you will use for annotating your proof will be in the [Annotations](#) section, pictured opposite. We've picked out some of these tools below:



1. Replace (Ins) Tool – for replacing text.




Strikes a line through text and opens up a text box where replacement text can be entered.

How to use it

- Highlight a word or sentence.
- Click on the [Replace \(Ins\)](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Type the replacement text into the blue box that appears.

standard framework for the analysis of microeconomics. Nevertheless, it also led to the emergence of a new paradigm of strategic behaviour. The number of competitors in the industry is that the structure of the industry is a key component of the main components of the industry. At the micro level, are exogenous variables important works on entry by Shiraz (M henceforth) we open the 'black b



2. Strikethrough (Del) Tool – for deleting text.



Strikes a red line through text that is to be deleted.

How to use it

- Highlight a word or sentence.
- Click on the [Strikethrough \(Del\)](#) icon in the Annotations section.

there is no room for extra profits and the number of competitors are zero and the number of (net) values are not determined by Blanchard and ~~Kiyotaki~~ (1987), perfect competition in general equilibrium. The effects of aggregate demand and supply in the classical framework assuming monopoly are an exogenous number of firms

3. Add note to text Tool – for highlighting a section to be changed to bold or italic.



Highlights text in yellow and opens up a text box where comments can be entered.

How to use it

- Highlight the relevant section of text.
- Click on the [Add note to text](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Type instruction on what should be changed regarding the text into the yellow box that appears.

dynamic responses of mark ups consistent with the **VAR** evidence

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4. Add sticky note Tool – for making notes at specific points in the text.




Marks a point in the proof where a comment needs to be highlighted.

How to use it

- Click on the [Add sticky note](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Click at the point in the proof where the comment should be inserted.
- Type the comment into the yellow box that appears.

and supply shocks. Most of the number of competitors and the impact is that the structure of the sector



USING e-ANNOTATION TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC PROOF CORRECTION


5. Attach File Tool – for inserting large amounts of text or replacement figures.



Inserts an icon linking to the attached file in the appropriate place in the text.

How to use it

- Click on the [Attach File](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Click on the proof to where you'd like the attached file to be linked.
- Select the file to be attached from your computer or network.
- Select the colour and type of icon that will appear in the proof. Click OK.



6. Add stamp Tool – for approving a proof if no corrections are required.




Inserts a selected stamp onto an appropriate place in the proof.

How to use it

- Click on the [Add stamp](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Select the stamp you want to use. (The [Approved](#) stamp is usually available directly in the menu that appears).
- Click on the proof where you'd like the stamp to appear. (Where a proof is to be approved as it is, this would normally be on the first page).

of the business cycle, starting with the
 on perfect competition, constant ret
 production. In this environment goods
 extra profits and the market for marke
 he market for goods is determined by the model. The New-Key
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


7. Drawing Markups Tools – for drawing shapes, lines and freeform annotations on proofs and commenting on these marks.

Allows shapes, lines and freeform annotations to be drawn on proofs and for comment to be made on these marks..

How to use it

- Click on one of the shapes in the [Drawing Markups](#) section.
- Click on the proof at the relevant point and draw the selected shape with the cursor.
- To add a comment to the drawn shape, move the cursor over the shape until an arrowhead appears.
- Double click on the shape and type any text in the red box that appears.



For further information on how to annotate proofs, click on the [Help](#) menu to reveal a list of further options:

